CDSC members Molly deBlanc and Kaylea Champion will be presenting at this year’s Aaron Swartz Day and International Hackathon. Molly will speak at 2:50 p.m. Pacific (talk title: My (Extended) Body, My Choice). Kaylea will speak at 3:15 p.m. Pacific (talk title: The Value of Anonymity: Evidence from Wikipedia). Registration and live stream details are available here: https://www.aaronswartzday.org/
If you’re attending ACM-CSCW this year, you are warmly invited to join CDSC members during our talks and other scheduled events. CSCW is not only virtual but spread across multiple weeks and offering sessions multiple times to accommodate timezones. We hope to see you there — we are eager to discuss our work with you!
CDSC members and affiliates are involved in CSCW beyond these public presentations. Nicholas Vincent, Sohyeon Hwang, and Sneha Narayan are part of the organizing team for the “Ethical Tensions, Norms, and Directions in the Extraction of Online Volunteer Work” workshop, where Molly de Blanc is scheduled to present and Kaylea Champion will be giving a lightning talk. Katherina Kloppenborg and Kaylea Champion are presenting in the Doctoral Consortium.
Although we might not notice it, much of the technology we rely on, from cell phones to cloud servers, is fueled by decades of effort by volunteers who create innovative software as well as the organizations necessary to sustain it. Despite this powerful legacy, we now are facing a crisis: not all of these critical components have been sufficiently maintained. Can we detect that an important software component is becoming neglected before major failures occur? Are these neglected packages just a matter of resources — old code and too few contributors — or can we see broader patterns that play a role, such as collaboration and organizational structures? Kaylea Champion has been working to answer these questions in her dissertation. As part of this work, she joined the software community metrics enthusiasts gathered at this year’s CHAOSSCon EU on September 12, 2022 as part of the Open Source Summit.
Kaylea’s presentation shares work in progress about the sources of underproduction, or when highly important packages see low quality development, in open software development. This presentation marks her second time at CHAOSSCon and builds on her work shared at last year’s conference in a lightning talk about detecting underproduction in Debian (see coverage of this work as presented to Debian folks here). Engaging with communities is a key part of this work: when we understand practitioner perspectives on underproduction and its causes, we can do science that supports taking immediate action. If you are interested in measuring the health of your collaborative community, let’s talk!
How should search engines be regulated? What are the implications of the EU Digital Services Act? If you are interested in technology policy, mark your calendar for an upcoming pre-conference virtual event: “Harms and Standards in Content Platform Governance” (October 13, 2022 at 5:00 a.m. PST, 8:00 a.m EST, 2:00 p.m. CEST). As part of the upcoming European Communication Research and Education conference, the Communication Law and Policy section has invited Kaylea Champion to present work she did with Benjamin Mako Hill and University of Washington students Jacinta Harshe, Isabella Brown, and Lucy Bao.
We examine the information landscape as manifested in search results during the Covid-19 pandemic using data we collected as part of the Covid-19 Digital Observatory Project. Our results provide evidence for the powerful ways that search engines shape our information environment–in terms of what information gets seen, the sources of that information, the market sectors that those sources operate within, and the partisan bias of those results.
This free event is oriented to connecting technology researchers and policymakers, and will include presentations of research from legal, communication, and critical perspectives.
SANER is primarily focused on software engineering practices, and several of the projects presented this year were of interest for social computing scholars. Here’s a quick rundown of presentations I particularly enjoyed:
Comparison of online help communities: This article by Mahshid Naghashzadeh, Amir Haghshenas, Ashkan Sami and David Lo compares two question/answer environments that we might imagine as competitors—the Matlab community of Stack Overflow versus the Matlab community hosted by Matlab. These sites have similar affordances and topics, however, the two sites seem to draw distinctly different types of questions. This article features an extensive hand-coded dataset by subject matter experts: How Do Users Answer MATLAB Questions on Q&A Sites? A Case Study on Stack Overflow and MathWorks[VIDEO]
Feedback: What goes wrong when software developers give one another feedback on their code? This study by a large team (Moataz Chouchen, Ali Ouni, Raula Gaikovina Kula, Dong Wang, Patanamon Thongtanunam, Mohamed Wiem Mkaouer and Kenichi Matsumoto) offers an ontology of the pitfalls and negative interactions that can occur during the popular code feedback practice known as code review: confused reviewers, divergent reviewers, low review participation, shallow review, and toxic review: Anti-patterns in Modern Code Review: Symptoms and Prevalence [VIDEO]
Critical Infrastructure: This study by Mahmoud Alfadel, Diego Elias Costa and Emad Shihab was focused on traits of security problems in Python and made some comparisons to npm. This got me thinking about different community-level factors (like bug release/security alert policies) that may influence underproduction. I also found myself wondering about inter-rater reliability for bug triage in communities like Python. The paper showed a very similar survival curve for bugs of varying severities, whereas my work in Debian showed distinct per-severity curves. One explanation for uniform resolution rate across severities could be high variability in how severity ratings are applied. Another factor worth considering may be the role of library abandonment: Empirical analysis of security vulnerabilities in python packages[VIDEO]
Critical software we all rely on can silently crumble away beneath us. Unfortunately, we often don’t find out software infrastructure is in poor condition until it is too late. Over the last year or so, I have been leading a project I announced earlier to measure software underproduction—a term I use to describe software that is low in quality but high in importance.
Underproduction reflects an important type of risk in widely used free/libre open source software (FLOSS) because participants often choose their own projects and tasks. Because FLOSS contributors work as volunteers and choose what they work on, important projects aren’t always the ones to which FLOSS developers devote the most attention. Even when developers want to work on important projects, relative neglect among important projects is often difficult for FLOSS contributors to see.
In the paper—coauthored with Benjamin Mako Hill—we describe a general approach for detecting “underproduced” software infrastructure that consists of five steps: (1) identifying a body of digital infrastructure (like a code repository); (2) identifying a measure of quality (like the time to takes to fix bugs); (3) identifying a measure of importance (like install base); (4) specifying a hypothesized relationship linking quality and importance if quality and importance are in perfect alignment; and (5) quantifying deviation from this theoretical baseline to find relative underproduction.
To show how our method works in practice, we applied the technique to an important collection of FLOSS infrastructure: 21,902 packages in the Debian GNU/Linux distribution. Although there are many ways to measure quality, we used a measure of how quickly Debian maintainers have historically dealt with 461,656 bugs that have been filed over the last three decades. To measure importance, we used data from Debian’s Popularity Contest opt-in survey. After some statistical machinations that are documented in our paper, the result was an estimate of relative underproduction for the 21,902 packages in Debian we looked at.
One of our key findings is that underproduction is very common in Debian. By our estimates, at least 4,327 packages in Debian are underproduced. As you can see in the list of the “most underproduced” packages—again, as estimated using just one more measure—many of the most at risk packages are associated with the desktop and windowing environments where there are many users but also many extremely tricky integration-related bugs.
We hope these results are useful to folks at Debian and the Debian QA team. We also hope that the basic method we’ve laid out is something that others will build off in other contexts and apply to other software repositories.
Paper Citation: Kaylea Champion and Benjamin Mako Hill. 2021. “Underproduction: An Approach for Measuring Risk in Open Source Software.” In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering (SANER 2021). IEEE.
Contact Kaylea Champion (email@example.com) with any questions or if you are interested in following up.
Although Wikipedia is the encyclopedia that anybody can edit, not all edits are welcome. Wikipedia is subject to a constant deluge of vandalism. Random people on the Internet are constantly “blanking” Wikipedia articles by deleting their content, replacing the text of articles with random characters, inserting outlandish claims or insults, and so on. Although volunteer editors and bots do an excellent job of quickly reverting the damage, the cost in terms of volunteer time is real.
Why do people spend their time and energy vandalizing web pages? For readers of Wikipedia that encounter a page that has been marred or replaced with nonsense or a slur—and especially for all the Wikipedia contributors who spend their time fighting back the tide of vandalism by checking and reverting bad edits and maintaining the bots and systems that keep order—it’s easy to dismiss vandals as incomprehensible sociopaths.
In a paper I just published in the ACM International Conference on Social Media and Society, I systematically analyzed a dataset of Wikipedia vandalism in an effort to identify different types of Wikipedia vandalism and to explain how each can been seen as “rational” from the point of view of the vandal.
Leveraging a dataset we created in some of our other work, the study used a random sample of contributions drawn from four groups that vary in the degree to the editors in question can be identified by others in Wikipedia: established users with accounts, users with accounts making their first edits, users without accounts, and users of the Tor privacy tool. Tor users were of particular interest to me because the use of Tor offers concrete evidence that a contributor is deliberately seeking privacy. I compared the frequency of vandalism in each group, developed an ontology to categorize it, and tested the relationship between group membership and different types of vandalism.
I found that the group that had engaged in the least effort in order to edit—users without accounts—were the most likely to vandalize. Although privacy-seeking Tor contributors were not the most likely to vandalize, vandalism from Tor-based contributors was less likely to be sociable, was more likely to be large scale (i.e. large blocks of text, such as by pasting in the same lines over and over), and more likely to express frustration with the Wikipedia community.
Thinking systematically about why different groups of users might engage in vandalism can help counter vandalism. Potential interventions might change not just the amount, but also the type, of vandalism a community will receive. Tools to detect vandalism may find that the patterns in each category allow for more accurate targeting. Ultimately, viewing vandals as more than irrational sociopaths opens potential avenues for dialogue.
Paper Citation: Kaylea Champion. 2020. “Characterizing Online Vandalism: A Rational Choice Perspective.” In International Conference on Social Media and Society (SMSociety’20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 47–57. https://doi.org/10.1145/3400806.3400813
A paper recently published at CSCW describes the results of a forensic qualitative analysis of contributions made to Wikipedia through the anonymous browsing system Tor. The project was conducted collaboratively with researchers from Drexel, NYU, and the University of Washington and complements a quantitative analysis of the same data we also published to provide a rich qualitative picture of what anonymity-seekers are trying to do when they contribute to Wikipedia. The work also shows how the ability to stay anonymous can play a important role in facilitating certain types of contributions to online knowledge bases like Wikipedia.
Media reports often describe how online platforms are tracking us. That said, trying to live our lives online without leaving a trail of our personal information can be difficult because many services can’t be used without an account and systems that protect privacy are often blocked. One popular approach to protecting our privacy online involves using the Tor network. Tor protects users from being identified by their IP address which can be tied to a physical location. However, if you’d like to contribute to Wikipedia using Tor, you’ll run into a problem. Although most IP addresses can edit without an account, Tor users are blocked from editing.
Other research by my team has shown that Wikipedia’s attempt to block Tor is imperfect and that some people have been able to edit despite the ban. This work also built a dataset of more than 11,000 contributions made to Wikipedia via Tor and used quantitative analysis to show that the contributions of people using Tor were about the same quality as contributions from other new editors and other contributors without accounts. Of course, given the unusual circumstances Tor-based contributors faced, we wondered if a deeper look into the content of their edits might tell us more about their motives and the kinds of contributions they seek to make. I led a qualitative investigation that sought to explore these questions.
Given the challenges of studying anonymity seekers, we designed a novel “forensic” qualitative approach that was inspired by the techniques common in the practice of computer security as well as criminal investigation. We applied to this new technique to a sample of 500 different editing sessions and sorted each session into a category based on what the editor seemed to be intending to do.
Most of the contributions we found fell into one of the two following categories:
Many contributions were quotidian attempts to add to the encyclopedia. Tor-based editors added facts, they fixed typos, and they updated train schedules. There’s no way to know if these individuals knew that they were just getting lucky in their ability to edit or if they were patiently reloading to evade the ban.
Second, we found harassing comments and vandalism. Unwelcome conduct is common in online environments, and sometimes more common when the likelihood of being identified is decreased. Some of the harassing comments we observed were direct responses to being banned as a Tor user.
Although these were most of what we observed, we also found evidence of several types of contributor intent:
We observed activism, as when a contributor tried to bring attention to journalistic accounts of environmental and human rights abuses being committed by a mining company, only to have editors traceable to the mining company repeatedly remove their edits. Another example included an editor trying to diminish the influence of alternative medicine proponents.
We also observed quality maintenance activities when editors used Wikipedia’s rules about appropriate sourcing to remove personal websites being cited in conspiracy theories.
We saw edit wars with Tor editors participating in a back-and-forth removal and replacement of content as part of a dispute, in some cases countering the work of an experienced Wikipedia editor who even other experienced editors had gauged to be biased.
Finally, we saw Tor-based editors participating in non-article discussions such as investigations of administrator misconduct, and protesting the mistrust of Tor editors by the Wikipedia platform.
In all, these themes led us to reflect on how the risks that individuals face when contributing to online communities are sometimes out of alignment with the risks the communities face by accepting their work. Expressing minoritized perspectives, maintaining community standards even when you may be targeted by the rulebreaker, highlighting injustice or acting as a whistleblower can be very risky for an individual, and may not be possible without privacy protections. Of course, in platforms seeking to support the public good, such knowledge and accountability may be crucial.
This project was conducted by Kaylea Champion, Nora McDonald, Stephanie Bankes, Joseph Zhang, Rachel Greenstadt, Andrea Forte, and Benjamin Mako Hill. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation (awards CNS-1703736 and CNS-1703049) and included the work of two undergraduates supported through an NSF REU supplement.
Paper Citation: Kaylea Champion, Nora McDonald, Stephanie Bankes, Joseph Zhang, Rachel Greenstadt, Andrea Forte, and Benjamin Mako Hill. 2019. A Forensic Qualitative Analysis of Contributions to Wikipedia from Anonymity Seeking Users. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interactaction. 3, CSCW, Article 53 (November 2019), 26 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359155